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Abstract: If a random firm were to increase its wages, would that decrease the firm’s churning 
(“excessive” worker reallocation)? Although the trade-off between wage and churning costs has 
received attention in both the labour and HRM literatures, there seems to be no evidence about the 
causal impact of wages upon churning. This paper seeks to fill that gap by considering detailed 
Portuguese matched employer-employee panel data and different identification methods. After 
presenting comprehensive evidence about job and worker flows and churning, we find that even 
models based on within-firm time differences do still generate the negative association between 
wages and turnover found in most research. However, that result no longer holds when we consider 
instrumental variables based on minimum wages determined by collective bargaining arrangements. 
One possible interpretation of our finding is that workers’ effort may not be sufficiently sensitive to 
wages: employers may replace workers priced out of the labour market with more skilled 
individuals, so that churning does not fall.   
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the several striking stylised facts that has emerged from the literature on job flows (Davis et 
al, 1996) is the large extent of worker churning (the excess of worker reallocation with respect to 
job reallocation). Contrary to what one may expect, even firms that exhibit stable levels of 
employment typically display high levels of hires and separations. Moreover, firms that are 
increasing the size of their workforce also generally exhibit a considerable number of separations, 
while hirings also tend to coexist with separations in firms that are cutting employment. 
 
For instance, in a well-known study, Burgess et al (2000) document substantial levels of worker 
churning, at 12.1% in manufacturing and 22.8% in non-manufacturing. These churning levels 
represent, respectively, 61.9% and 70.4% of total worker flows, implying that most hirings and 
separations that occur within firms do not translate into changes in firm size (Hamermesh et al., 
1996, Albaek and Sorensen, 1998, Abowd et al., 1999, Burgess et al., 2001, and Ilmakunnas and 
Maliranta, 2005, present additional evidence of churning).
1 
 
The importance of churning in most firms’ employment policies raises important questions about 
the quality of the matching between employers and employees achieved by the labour market. For 
instance, since hirings or separations entail costs for both employers and employees, and low 
average tenure levels are typically detrimental to the acquisition of productivity-enhancing firm-
specific skills, one may expect that the market would adjust in such a way that churning would be a 
less sizeable phenomenon. For instance, as firms age, they could improve the selection of 
candidates for their vacancies and their retention practices, in order to minimise churning. 
 
In any case, it is important to acknowledge the role of wages upon the amount of churning in the 
labour market. For instance, one of the mechanisms that may generate efficiency wages (Akerlof 
and Yellen, 1986) is about the reduction in turnover costs achieved by increasing pay. However, 
little is known in both the labour and HRM literatures about the specific trade-offs between wage 
and churning costs faced by firms. More specifically, there is no evidence about whether a random 
firm that were to increase its wages would typically achieve a reduction in churning. Indeed, while 
there is plenty of evidence about the association between different HRM variables and different 
                                                  
1 See also Martins (2006b) for evidence that churning does not only correspond to “replacement hiring”, the 
most common interpretation in the literature: events involving “job upgrading” or “job downgrading” (i.e. 
firms changing the profile of their workforces in terms of skills and/or occupations) also explain part of the 
“excessive” worker turnover (with respect to job flows).   3
firm performance indicators, there is a disappointing lack of evidence about causal relationships 
(Guest et al, 2003, Lazear, 1995, Bandiera et al., 2005).  
 
This paper seeks to fill a part of such large gap in our understanding of the causal impact of 
personnel policies by focusing specifically on the relationship between churning and pay (see also 
Barth and Dale-Olsen, 1999, and Dale-Olsen, 2006). Our analysis is implemented by considering 
long and detailed Portuguese matched employer-employee panel data and different identification 
methods, including instrumental variables. After describing evidence about job and worker flows 
and churning for the entire economy (including the services sector, unlike many earlier papers), we 
present regression results that explain the role of wages upon the variability of churning levels 
across and within firms over time.  
 
As in other studies, we find, at first, that churning is negatively related to wages. This result still 
holds when considering only within-firm time variation. However, because the wages paid by firms 
are, at least to some extent, a choice variable, such estimates cannot necessarily be interpreted as 
causal parameters. Once we consider that, we obtain our main result: when instrumenting wages by 
using variation in wages driven by factors outside the control of firms (wages determined by 
collective bargaining contracts, in our case) we find that the relationship between wages and 
churning is actually non-negative: either significantly or insignificantly positive, depending on the 
estimates. 
 
Section 2 presents the data and some statistics about job and worker flows. Section 3 describes the 




2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
We employ the “Quadros de Pessoal” (Personnel Records) data set, an annual census of all firms 
based in Portugal that have at least one employee. The census, conducted by the Ministry of 
Employment, requires that each firm provides detailed information about itself (size, industry, 
region, age, sales, etc) and also each one of its employees (gender, age, schooling, tenure, wages, 
etc). Moreover, each firm and each employee is assigned a unique identifier, allowing one to follow 
them over time. In this paper, we use data from all years from 1986 to 2000 (except 1990, when 
only firm-level data are available).   4
 
“Quadros de Pessoal” can thus be characterised as a matched employer-employee panel data set 
covering a very large share of the entire labour market over a relatively long period. (The groups of 
workers not covered are the unemployed, the civil servants, the self-employed and the informal 
workers.) The data used here includes information about 2.4 million firms-year and almost 30 
million workers-year. Moreover, because the main goals of the census are to check compliance with 




All flow variables are defined in the way that has become standard in the literature, as described in 
Davis et al (1996). Each rate is constructed by dividing a given flow (job creation, for instance) by 
the average employment of the firm over the two periods analysed. For instance, the job creation 
rate is defined as JC =










, if Lt>Lt-1, or 0, if Lt<Lt-1, in which Lt stands for the firm size 
in period t. Similarly, the job destruction rate is defined as JD =










if Lt<Lt-1, or 0, if 
Lt>Lt-1, while the net job creation rate corresponds to JC – JD and the job reallocation rate is JC + 
JD. The hiring rate is H =








, in which Hiringst,t-1 denotes the number of workers present 
in the firm in period t but not in period t-1, while the separation rate is S = 









which Separationst,t-1 denotes the number of workers present in the firm in period t-1 but not in 
period t. Finally, the worker reallocation rate is H + S, and the churning rate is defined as CR = WR 
– JR. 
 
All descriptive statistics and regression results are carried out by weighting each firm-level 
observation by its average employment.  
 
We follow Blanchard and Portugal (2001) (see also Varejão, 2003) in the computation of worker 
flows and classify as (new) hirings all workers whose date of hiring was subsequent to the census 
date of the previous period (March, up to 1993, and October, from 1994 onwards). Since ΔL ≡ H – 
S, in which L is firm size, H is hirings and S separations, the number of separations can be defined 
                                                  
2 Although we do believe data quality is indeed of high standards, there are inevitably some missing or 
incorrect observations, particularly for smaller firms and/or in the earlier years of the census, when 
computers were not so widespread.    5




Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics. Given that they refer to the entire population of 
Portuguese firms with at least one employee, they may deserve some particular attention. The first 
two columns refer to all firms in all years (a total of 2.899.846 firms-year, including 
interpolations
4). The remaining four columns refer to 1987 and 2000 (given that 1986 is the first 
year in our data, it is not possible to compute job and worker flows variables for that year), which 
include, respectively, 128.754 and 301.607 firms. 
 
Average firm size is 1,032 – in other words, given that our statistics are weighted by firm size, an 
average worker has 1,031 colleagues in her firm. 3% of all firms-year are new firms, while 5% are 
in their last year in the data. About 9% of firms are foreign owned (defined as when at least 50% of 
the equity of the firm is held by foreign investors). 39% of the workforce is female and their 
average schooling attainment is 6.7 years. They have 24 years of experience and almost 100 months 
of tenure, while their last promotion occurred, on average, 56 months before the date of the census.  
 
Average job creation rate is 14%, while job destruction rate is 12%, resulting in a net job creation 
rate of 2%. Hiring and separation rates are almost twice that, at 23% and 22%. It is also noticeable 
all four rates increase significantly from 1987 to 2000, particularly the job destruction and the 
separation rates (from 9% to 18% and from 17% to 27%, respectively).  
 
Figure 1 presents the distribution of net job creation rates in 2000 (similar figures could be 
presented for the remaining years). As documented in other studies, we find a large concentration 
around zero, the modal category, and at the two spikes at -2 and 2 (firm deaths and births, 
respectively). Except for those two extreme cases, very few firms (almost none) exhibit changes in 
employment of less than (greater than) the smaller spikes at -2/3 (2/3).  
 
Coming back to Table 1, one can calculate churning rates at an average of about 20%, 
corresponding therefore to almost half of the worker reallocation rate. Moreover, we also find that 
the distribution of the churning rates is highly skewed. Out of the 2.3 million firms-year for which 
                                                  
3 One problem with this approach is that any underestimation of H (for instance, because of missing or 
incorrect hiring dates) will also lead to the underestimation of S. However, from a more detailed analysis of 
this issue – see Martins (2006a) –, we believe this problem is not particularly relevant in our study. 
4 A closer inspection of the data indicated that some firms do not report their information in some years. In 
order to avoid biases in terms of the artificial definition of too many new and closing firms, the firm size of 
those firm-years (less than 10% of the firms-year used) was interpolated.    6
churning can be calculated, churning is greater than zero in only about 26% of the cases (not 
weighting by size). From Figure 2, which presents the distribution of churning rates in 2000, we can 
also see that only a very limited number of firms exhibit churning rates above 50%.  
 
Moreover, gross monthly pay is on average €738 (2004 prices), ranging from €595 in 1987 to €814 
in 2000. Hourly pay also increases, at a slightly higher rate. The last row refers to the variable that 
will be used as an instrument later in the paper. The variable is the percentage of workers in each 
firm that earn a base wage that is the modal wage in the workers’ occupation (defined at the four-
digit level). On average, about 18% of workers in each firm (again, weighted by firm size) earn 
those modal wages. 
 
Table 2 presents more detailed results about the flows of jobs and workers across firms. In the first 
table, the firms are divided into their sector of activity (agriculture, manufacturing and services).
5 
As in other studies, the services sector exhibits much higher rates of job creation and destruction 
and of worker hirings and separations – and therefore the services sector also exhibits higher rates 
of job and worker reallocation. For instance, worker reallocation is 51.5% in services and only 
39.2% in manufacturing. However, we find that the agriculture sector is characterised by even 
higher job and worker reallocation rates. Finally, another important result is that, while churning is 
much higher in services than in manufacturing, its share in total worker reallocation is very similar 






In this section we present the main results of the paper. These results involve the estimation of a 
simple reduced-form linear equation that relates the churning rate of a firm in a given year with the 
average wage paid by that firm to its workers plus a number of controls. These controls include 
different measures of firm heterogeneity that may help explaining churning rates, including firm 
and time fixed effects. The equation is as follows: 
 
(1)  it t i it it it X W C ε δ γ δ β + + + + = '  
 
                                                  
5 Electricity and Gas, and Construction have been included in the Services sector. The agriculture sector also 
includes Forestry and Fishing. 
6 See also the Appendix for a more detailed analysis of differences in these variables across industries.   7
Cit is the churning rate of firm i in period t, Wit is the average wage, and Xit are firm-year 
characteristics (the percentage of women in the workforce, average education and average 
experience of the workers, the levels of sales and of equity and log firm size), γ and δ are firm and 
time fixed effects, respectively. As suggested above, the firm fixed effects are of particular 
importance, as otherwise one would have to assume that the wage policy of the firm is chosen 
randomly in order to interpret the β coefficient as the causal impact of wages upon churning. 
 
The estimation method also deserves some discussion. Given the large number of zeros in the 
dependent variable, a tobit model would be appropriate. However, to the best of our knowledge, an 
estimator for this model with fixed effects has not yet been developed. We are also not aware of 
tobit models, even with random effects, that could incorporate instrumental variables.  
 
Given such technical constraints, our approach is to conduct our analysis first by employing a 
random effects tobit model instead. We then adopt a standard OLS model, first excluding firm fixed 
effects, and then including them. Finally, given that we are also concerned about the endogeneity of 
the within-firm time variation of wages, we also consider a model in which we instrument the 
change in wages. As a robustness test, we also replicate the previous models considering only firms 
that have a positive level of churning, including with a specification based on log churning and log 
wages. 
 
Our instrument is the share  of workers being paid collective bargaining contractual wages 
(henceforth SWCW). The choice of this variable is motivated by the very interesting work by 
Cardoso and Portugal (2005), who study the implications of collective wage bargaining upon wage 
determination. In order to derive their results, Cardoso and Portugal (2005) assume that bargained 
wages – basically an industry/occupation specific minimum wage – can be defined as the modal 
wage for each worker’s job category, an assumption that receives support from the sample of jobs 
for which they collect wage information from collective agreements.  
 
Our specific approach underpinning our adoption of the instrument involves arguing first that the 
greater the SWCW, the lower the average wages paid by the firm. This is straightforward because 
those contractual wages are wage floors – firms are free to pay above those agreed levels and most 
workers do indeed earn more). More important, we also argue that the SWCW does not affect 
directly the level of churning of the firm. In other words, it is not the share of workers that 
determines their mobility decisions, it is instead the wages themselves. This assumption 
corresponds to the exclusion restriction.   8
 
To sum it up, all the effect from SWCW upon churning in each firm is assumed to take place 
through the wages paid by the firm; the share is only a predictor, which is also influenced by factors 
outside the control of the firm, namely the bargaining process that takes place between different 
employers association and different unions. Moreover, as suggested before, we also expect the 
relationship between the instrument and wages to be negative: controlling for other variables, the 
greater the SWCW, the lower the average wage paid by the firm. 
 
Table 3 presents the first set of results. All equations consider all firms (including those with zero 
churning rates). The first column is based on a tobit model with random effects. We find the 
expected significantly negative relationship between average pay and churning rates. The following 
three columns are based on OLS. Column 2 ignores the possible endogeneity of wages across firms 
while column 3 ignores the possible endogeneity of wage differences within firms, over time. In 
both cases, we again obtain very significant, negative coefficients of wages. For instance, the result 
of column 3 indicates that for each €1,000 extra that each worker earns per month, there is a decline 
of 1.7pp in that firm’s churning rate. This negative relationship is consistent with the pattern 
documented in Figure 3, that depicts the level of churning and average pay across all industries in 
2004: the fitted line, weighted by industry size, is clearly downward sloping. 
 
However, in column 4, when we instrument wage differences with the shares of workers that are 
paid collective bargaining wages, we find that the coefficient remains statistically significant, but it 
is now positive. At 0.32, the coefficient indicates that there is an increase of 32pp in a firm’s 
churning rate for each €1,000 increase of average pay. Although the contribution of the instrument 
in the first stage is not particularly strong (a partial R
2 of 0.0022), the instrument is significantly 
negative, as expected from our discussion above.  
 
Overall, the result suggests that, contrary to previous findings, if firms pay higher wages (because 
of exogenous reasons), then churning may actually increase. Roughly speaking, a doubling of 
wages would lead to the doubling of churning. 
 
In order to test the robustness of this (surprising) result, we repeat the analysis of the three last 
columns of Table 3 but considering only firms-year in which churning is positive (see Table 4). 
This selection of the sample is motivated by the fact that, as mentioned before, a considerable 
number of firms does not exhibit churning. In any case, we still find that the same pattern of results 
emerges, with significantly negative coefficients in the first two specifications (those without   9
instruments) and a positive coefficient (although now insignificant) when wages are instrumented. 
Finally, we consider the same sample of firms-years (those with positive levels of churning) but 
now adopting a log-log specification. The same pattern emerges again, with negative elasticities for 
the first two specifications and an insignificant, but also positive coefficient when wages are 







Our finding of a non-negative causal relationship between wages and churning (which is even 
significantly positive in some specifications) may at first seem counterintuitive. Presumably, if a 
firm were to increase the wages paid to its workers due to forces outside the firm’s control, then 
workers would be less interested in leaving their jobs. Therefore, churning – understood as 
“replacement hiring” –, would fall. This would then generate a negative relationship between pay 
and churning.  
 
In our view, one aspect that may be missing in this interpretation concerns the behaviour of firms 
once their workers become better paid due to exogenous forces. According to some efficiency wage 
models, such wage increases may pay for themselves, but only if workers’ effort increase more than 
proportionately. However, if that were the case, one would presumably expect that firms would be 
keen to implement those pay rises in the first place, before being forced to do so by virtue of the 
increase in collective bargaining contractual wages. Moreover, as the outside options of workers 
earning the minimum wage would also increase (i.e. the minimum wage in other firms has also 
increased, by virtue of the collective nature of the bargaining), then the incentive for those workers 
to put in more effort will in fact be relatively weak. 
 
Our explanation for the non-negative relationship between wages and churning is therefore that 
workers’ effort may not be sufficiently responsive to wage increases, particularly in the firms most 
affected by our instrument (a local average treatment effect). Such firms are those that are paying 
lower wages, so that their wage bill goes up significantly when collective bargaining increases 
minimum wages. If effort then does not increase at least in a commensurate way to the increase in 
pay, then employers will prefer to dismiss or, more generally, promote the separations of those 
workers whose wages exceed their productivity and replace them with more skilled workers. To the   10
extent that not all dimensions of skill are captured in our regression controls, this process of 
replacement can easily prevent worker churning rates from falling, thus explaining the non-negative 
association between wages and churning documented in our study, when using instrumental 
variables.  
 
Of course, it would be desirable to present additional empirical evidence about this interpretation in 
future research. One possible way of achieving that would be to follow the individuals whose pay is 
most affected by collective bargaining (i.e. those workers that earn the industry/occupation 
minimum wage). One could then examine whether such workers are also more likely to leave their 
jobs once their wages are increased by virtue of new collective bargaining agreements, as suggested 





Our study examined the relationship between churning and wages, using matched data covering the 
entire population of Portuguese firms between 1986 and 2000. We believe this relationship deserves 
attention from the points of view of both labour economics and human resource management. 
While economists may be concerned about the waste of resources that surrounds the constant 
replacement of workers in firms, HRM experts will find it helpful to draw on stronger quantitative 
evidence about how firms may ensure that employer-employee matches are long-lasting. 
 
Given that we are interested in the causal relationship between the two variables, we used within-
firm time variation (an improvement upon studies that focus on cross-section variation only). 
Moreover, we also exploit what we argue is a source of exogenous variation in wages: the share of 
workers in each firm being paid collective bargaining wages. Using that instrument, we find that the 
standard negative correlations between wages and churning become a non-negative causal link. We 
also argue that this finding may be explained by a relatively weak responsiveness of effort to wages 
in the firms affected by the instrument and the consequent replacement by employers of priced-out 
workers by more skilled new hires in such a way that churning does not fall with wages. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics 
        
  All Firms  1987  2000 
Variable  Mean Std.  Dev Mean Std.  Dev Mean Std.  Dev 
Firm Size  1,032.0 3521.0 1,715.5 5,155.3 688.5 2,285.8 
First Year  0.03 0.18 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 
Last Year  0.05 0.21 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 
Foreign Firm  0.09 0.29 0.09 0.28 0.11 0.31 
Female  0.39 0.31 0.34 0.29 0.42 0.32 
Schooling  6.70 2.38 5.81 1.92 7.57 2.64 
Experience  24.08 7.03 24.99 6.44 23.55 7.43 
Tenure  99.65 71.20  111.24  66.57 89.46 69.32 
Months since Last 
Promotion  56.30 49.19 56.34 41.19 58.22 50.18 
Job Creation Rate  0.14 0.37 0.13 0.38 0.15 0.39 
Job Destruction Rate  0.12 0.34 0.09 0.31 0.18 0.49 
Net Job Creation Rate  0.02 0.54 0.04 0.51 -0.03 0.67 
Hiring Rate  0.23 0.40 0.21 0.40 0.26 0.41 
Separation Rate  0.22 0.36 0.17 0.32 0.27 0.44 
Worker Reallocation Rate  0.46 0.52 0.38 0.49 0.52 0.57 
Monthly Pay  738.22 446.55 595.45 309.45 813.95 490.96 
Hourly Pay  4.54 3.40 3.56 2.14 5.10 3.29 
Binding Wages  0.18 0.23 0.19 0.21 0.18 0.25 
 
Notes: Author’s calculations based on “Quadros de Pessoal” data. “Firm size” refers to the number of workers in each 
firm; “first year” and “last year” are dummy variables taking value one when the firm appears for the first or last time in 
the data, respectively; “foreign firm” is a dummy variable taking value one if at least 50% of the equity of the firm is held 
by foreign investors; “schooling” refers to the years of schooling attained by each worker; “tenure” is measured in 
months; “monthly” and “hourly pay” are measured in 2004 euros; “binding wages” refer to the percentage of the 
workforce in each firm that is paid the wage determined by collective bargaining (this is measured following the approach 
of Cardoso and Portugal, 2005), considering only the worker’s occupation or his/her occupation and industry (see main 
text for more details). Job and worker flow rates follow the standard definition in the literature (more details in the main 
text).   14
 
Table 2 - Job and Worker Flows Rates, 1986-2000, by Sector   
          
  Job Job  Net  Job  Job   
Sector Creation  Destruction  Creation  Reallocation   
Agriculture  0.198 0.194  0.005  0.392   
Manufacturing  0.109 0.113  -0.004  0.222   
Services  0.166 0.123  0.044  0.289   
          
      Worker  Worker  W. Churning / 
Sector Hiring  Separation  Reallocation  Churning  W.  Reallocation
Agriculture  0.340 0.351  0.691  0.265  0.439 
Manufacturing  0.188 0.203  0.392  0.163  0.518 
Services  0.275 0.241  0.515  0.218  0.502 
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Table 3 - Impact of Wages on Churning, Different Models 
Dependent variable: Churning Rate; Years used: 1987-2000, except 1990 
 
                            1    2    3             4 
            RE Tobit       Pooled OLS            FE                FE-IV 
                     
Avg pay            -0.029***       -.076***             -.017***             .320***                                    
                        [0.000]           [0.000]               [0.000]            [0.000]             
 
Fixed Effects          X              X   
IV                                 X     
 
 
R-squared                                0.119               0.571               -0.022    
No. obs           931093           931093            931093             931093    
 
Notes: The coefficient of the instrumental variable in the first-stage equation is -.067 (t-ratio: -9.44), with a partial R2 of 
0.0022 and an F-statistic of 89.05. Controls used in all regressions: year dummies, percentage of women, average 
education, average experience, sales, equity and log firm size. The explanatory variable is measured in thousands of 
euros(2004 prices). Only firms present three or more years over 1987-2000 are included in the analysis. Robust standard 
errors. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.    16
 
Table 4 - Impact of Wages on Churning, Different Models 
Dependent variable: Churning Rate or Log Churning Rate; Years used: 1987-2000, except 1990 
 
                                1                  2                3    4          5      6   
    Pooled OLS      FE           FE-IV         Pooled OLS     FE             FE-IV 
                                                                                                         
Avg pay             -0.106***      -0.025***       0.164                                                 
                          [0.006]        [0.005]          [0.123]                                                 
Log avg pay                                                                  -0.511***      -0.120**        0.167    
                                                                           [0.027]          [0.038]        [0.845]    
 
Fixed Effects      X         X              X                  X 
IV                 X             X 
 
R-squared            0.186          0.694          0.057          0.312           0.710            0.104    
No. obs             413246         413246      387468       413246         413246         387468    
 
Notes: The coefficient of the instrumental variable in the first-stage equation of column 3 is -.064 (t-ratio: -5.59), with a 
partial R2 of 0.0017 and an F-statistic of 31.26. For column 6, the instrumental variable in the first-stage equation 
coefficient is -.055 (t-ratio: -6.72), with a partial R2 of 0.0016 and an F-statistic of 45.09. Controls used in all regressions: 
year dummies, percentage of women, average education, average experience, sales, equity and log firm size. The 
explanatory variable is measured in thousands of euros (2004 prices). Only firms present three or more years over 1987-
2000 are included in the analysis. Robust standard errors. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Source: Author’s calculation based on “Quadros de Pessoal” data.  
 
 
   18















0 .5 1 1.5 2
Worker Churning Rate
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on “Quadros de Pessoal” data. 
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Source: Author’s calculation based on “Quadros de Pessoal” data. 
Note: The size of each industry in the Figure is proportional to its size, as measured in terms of employment.   20
Appendix 
 
Table A1 decomposes information about job and worker flows and churning rates into two-digit 
industries for all three sectors. The results below support the findings of considerable heterogeneity 
in job flows, an important result of Davis et al (1996). For instance, while net job creation rates in 
manufacturing are negative over the 1986-2000 period (although at only -0.4%), specific industries 
can exhibit very different patterns.  
 
On the one extreme, firms in the ‘Petroleum and Natural Gas’ industry have employment declines 
of 103%, and those in ‘Coke and Refined Petroleum’ see their number of jobs falling by 12.2%; on 
the other extreme, the ‘Recycling’ and ‘Motor Vehicles’ industries increase their jobs by 10.5% and 
3.2%. Moreover, job reallocation rates also tend to be high although, again, they vary considerably 
across industries. These results are further evidence of the dynamic nature of labour markets and the 
constant reshuffling of jobs across firms, within or not the same industries. 
 
 
Table A1 - Job and Worker Flows Rates, 1986-2000, by Industry   
      
  Job Job  Net  Job  Job 
Industry Creation Destruction  Creation  Reallocation
Agriculture  0.204 0.194 0.010 0.398 
Forestry  0.244 0.208 0.036 0.452 
Fishing 0.124  0.181  -0.057  0.306 
Mining 0.015  1.529  -1.513  1.544 
Petroleum and Natural Gas  0.000  1.029  -1.029  1.029 
Mining of Uranium  0.082  0.054  0.029  0.136 
Mining of Metal Ores  0.062  0.153  -0.091  0.215 
Other Mining and Quarrying  0.142 0.118 0.025 0.260 
Food Products and Beverages  0.098  0.112  -0.014  0.210 
Tobacco Products  0.029  0.066  -0.038  0.095 
Textiles 0.070  0.106  -0.036  0.176 
Wearing  Apparel  0.144 0.127 0.017 0.271 
Leather, Luggage, and Footwear  0.120  0.109  0.011  0.228 
Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 0.122  0.133  -0.011  0.255 
Paper and Paper Products  0.070  0.104  -0.034  0.173 
Publishing,  Printing  0.112 0.097 0.015 0.209 
Coke, Refined Petroleum  0.003  0.125  -0.122  0.129 
Chemicals 0.072  0.115  -0.043  0.186 
Rubber and Plastics Products  0.101  0.100  0.001  0.201 
Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products  0.103  0.101  0.002  0.204 
Basic Metals  0.072  0.129  -0.058  0.201 
Fabricated Metal Products  0.136  0.119  0.017  0.255 
Machinery and Equipment  0.103  0.105  -0.002  0.208 
Office, Accounting and Computing Machine  0.215  0.215  0.000  0.430 
Electrical  Machinery  0.132 0.102 0.029 0.234 
Radio, Television, Communication Equipme  0.134  0.136  -0.002  0.270 
Medical, Precision, Optical Instruments  0.080 0.079 0.001 0.159 
Motor  Vehicles  0.121 0.090 0.032 0.211 
other Transport Equipment  0.081  0.125  -0.044  0.206 
Furniture  0.126 0.115 0.012 0.241 
Recycling  0.217 0.112 0.105 0.329 
Electricity, Gas  0.091  0.128  -0.037  0.219 
Water 0.039  0.042  -0.002  0.081 
Construction  0.202 0.152 0.049 0.354 
Sale, Maintenance of Vehicles; Fuel  0.141  0.111  0.030  0.252   21
Wholesale  Trade  0.152 0.120 0.031 0.272 
Retail  Trade  0.194 0.136 0.058 0.329 
Hotels  and  Restaurants  0.192 0.141 0.050 0.333 
Land  Transport  0.103 0.092 0.011 0.194 
Water Transport  0.089  0.133  -0.044  0.222 
Air  Transport  0.042 0.030 0.013 0.072 
Auxiliary Transport; Travel  Agencies  0.125 0.117 0.008 0.242 
Post and Telecommunications  0.110  0.120  -0.010  0.230 
Financial Intermediation  0.059  0.062  -0.003  0.121 
Insurance and Pension Funding  0.075  0.083  -0.009  0.158 
Activities auxiliary to Finance  0.215  0.117  0.097  0.332 
Real  Estate  0.284 0.176 0.108 0.460 
Renting of Machinery and Equipment  0.185  0.112  0.074  0.297 
Computer and related activities  0.294  0.127  0.167  0.421 
Research and Development  0.178  0.110  0.068  0.287 
Other Business activities  0.241  0.134  0.107  0.374 
Public Administration and Defence  0.156  0.098  0.058  0.255 
Education  0.139 0.088 0.051 0.227 
Health and Social Work  0.144  0.074  0.069  0.218 
Sewage and Refuse Disposal, Sanitation  0.343  0.067  0.275  0.410 
Activities of Membership Organizations  0.119  0.109  0.010  0.227 
Recreational and Sporting activities  0.128  0.100  0.028  0.227 
Other Service activities  0.210  0.160  0.050  0.370 
Extra-Territorial Organizations  0.146  0.149  -0.002  0.295 
 
 
Table A2 presents worker flows across all two-digit industries, over the 1986-2000 period. A 
striking result from this table is the considerable dispersion of worker reallocation rates across 
industries. They range between 171% and 162% for ‘Petroleum and Natural Gas’ and ‘Mining’ to 
as little as 13.1% and 16.9% in ‘Water’ and ‘Financial Intermediation’, respectively. 
 
Churning rates also vary considerably across industries. They range from 0% and 3.1% in 
‘Petroleum and Natural Gas’ and ‘Mining’ to as much as 43.1% and 39.5% in ‘Fishing’ and ‘Other 
Business Activities’ (which includes, for instance, ‘Cleaning Services’ firms), respectively. 
However, as suggested before, in the comparison between the manufacturing and the services 
sectors, there is much less dispersion across industries in the ratios between churning and worker 
reallocation rates (the coefficient of variation drops to about half), indicating that the two rates are 
positively correlated (an unweighted Pearson correlation of 18%). 
 
 
Table A2 - Worker Flows Rates, 1986-2000, by Industry      
          
     Worker  Worker  W.Churn.  / 
Industry Hiring  Separation Realloc.  Churning  W.Realloc. 
Agriculture 0.338  0.342  0.680  0.247  0.423 
Forestry 0.366  0.339  0.705  0.218  0.336 
Fishing 0.340  0.421  0.761  0.431  0.609 
Mining 0.032  1.592  1.624  0.031  0.036 
Petroleum and Natural Gas  0.000  1.714  1.714  0.000  0.000 
Mining of Uranium  0.076  0.114  0.190  0.054  0.071 
Mining of Metal Ores  0.117  0.211  0.328  0.115  0.539 
Other Mining and Quarrying 0.247  0.236  0.483  0.216  0.484 
Food Products and Beverages  0.199  0.227  0.426  0.213  0.579 
Tobacco Products  0.083  0.120  0.202  0.108  0.507 
Textiles 0.126  0.171  0.297  0.119  0.512   22
Wearing Apparel  0.233  0.222  0.455  0.168  0.526 
Leather, Luggage, and Footwear 0.207  0.204  0.411  0.172  0.556 
Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 0.204  0.226  0.430  0.164 0.478 
Paper and Paper Products  0.126  0.171  0.297  0.121  0.517 
Publishing, Printing  0.195  0.191  0.386  0.172  0.529 
Coke, Refined Petroleum  0.024  0.149  0.173  0.040  0.400 
Chemicals 0.122  0.183  0.305  0.119  0.475 
Rubber and Plastics Products  0.187  0.196  0.382  0.176  0.548 
Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products  0.188  0.196  0.384  0.177  0.545 
Basic Metals  0.130  0.196  0.326  0.120  0.437 
Fabricated Metal Products  0.234  0.224  0.458  0.194  0.507 
Machinery and Equipment  0.184  0.194  0.377  0.168  0.515 
Office, Accounting & Computing Machines  0.276  0.288  0.564  0.113  0.339 
Electrical Machinery  0.222  0.210  0.432  0.193  0.509 
Radio, Television, Communication Equip.  0.187  0.223  0.409  0.123  0.421 
Medical, Precision, Optical Instruments 0.146  0.148  0.294  0.135 0.553 
Motor Vehicles  0.181  0.169  0.350  0.143  0.510 
other Transport Equipment  0.131  0.181  0.312  0.102  0.407 
Furniture 0.215  0.209  0.424  0.163  0.481 
Recycling 0.308  0.212  0.519  0.181  0.459 
Electricity, Gas  0.129  0.100  0.229  0.031  0.370 
Water 0.062  0.068  0.131  0.054  0.535 
Construction 0.358  0.313  0.671  0.301  0.517 
Sale, Maintenance of Vehicles; Fuel  0.231  0.211  0.442  0.178  0.496 
Wholesale Trade  0.242  0.225 0.467 0.189  0.496 
Retail Trade  0.291  0.248  0.539  0.194  0.432 
Hotels and Restaurants  0.359  0.312  0.671  0.318  0.552 
Land Transport  0.153  0.156  0.309  0.119  0.507 
Water Transport  0.189  0.249  0.438  0.211  0.599 
Air Transport  0.101  0.097  0.198  0.127  0.693 
Auxiliary Transport; Travel Agencies 0.187  0.196  0.383  0.143  0.314 
Post and Telecommunications  0.159  0.171  0.330  0.100  0.594 
Financial Intermediation  0.075  0.094  0.169  0.064  0.518 
Insurance and Pension Funding  0.085  0.127  0.213  0.074  0.395 
Activities auxiliary to Finance  0.289  0.202  0.491  0.137  0.317 
Real Estate  0.399  0.286  0.685  0.193  0.372 
Renting of Machinery and Equipment 0.317  0.254  0.571  0.259  0.514 
Computer and related activities  0.412  0.247  0.659  0.222  0.425 
Research and Development  0.284  0.231  0.516  0.224  0.527 
Other Business activities  0.440  0.348  0.788  0.395  0.543 
Public Administration and Defence  0.255  0.199  0.455  0.171  0.522 
Education 0.233  0.195  0.429  0.196  0.548 
Health and Social Work  0.216  0.154  0.370  0.148  0.512 
Sewage and Refuse Disposal, Sanitation  0.504  0.224  0.728  0.302  0.497 
Activities of Membership Organizations  0.171  0.180  0.351  0.121  0.395 
Recreational and Sporting activities  0.226  0.212  0.438  0.205  0.551 
Other Service activities  0.318  0.268  0.586  0.181  0.374 
Extra-Territorial Organizations  0.202  0.193  0.395  0.068  0.308 
 
 
This relationship between churning and worker reallocation rates can also be inferred from Figure 
A1, which plots job and worker reallocation rates by industry in 2000. Since churning is difference 
between the two, it can be seen that churning increases with worker reallocation. 
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